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PEOPLE V. ALEXANDER 1
(decided, March 21, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
The New York Court of Appeals held in a majority opinion that
the supreme court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea after claiming to be
incompetent and when the charges were dropped before sentenc-
ing.2 The majority also held that a court-ordered psychiatric exam
that failed to address the defendant's mental competency at the
time he pled guilty did not constitute reversible error. 3 The major-
ity opinion was drafted by Judge Rossenblatt. Chief Judge Kay,




The defendant was indicted for beating his girlfriend and was
held in contempt for violating a court order to stay away from the
victim.5 At trial, the defendant entered an Alford plea to the crimi-
nal contempt charge. 6 While he was awaiting his sentence, the de-
fendant attempted to withdraw his guilty plea claiming he was
incompetent when he pled. 7 In response to the motion, the trial
court ordered a psychiatric examination to determine if the defen-
dant was competent to stand trial." The examining physicians con-
cluded that while the defendant did require medication for a
personality disorder, he was neither an incapacitated person nor
did he suffer from any condition that would prevent him from
1. 97 N.Y.2d 482 (2002).
2. Id. at 484.
3. Id. at 485.
4. Id. at 488.
5. Id. at 484; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51(b) (v) (2002).
6. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 484; see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
(An Alford plea is a plea that does not involve a recitation of guilt and is typically
entered as a result of a plea bargain).
7. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 484.
8. Id.; see also N.Y.CRIM.PROC. LAW § 730 (2002).
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standing trial.9 Although the examining physicians did not make
any conclusions as to the defendant's condition on the day he en-
tered the plea, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea.1 0
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.1 Defendant argued
that he was incompetent at the time he entered the plea and there-
fore it was invalid. 12 Additionally, the defendant argued the plea
should be invalidated because the court did not ask the defendant
if he was on medication. 13 Finally, the defendant argued the plea
was invalid for the following reasons: the victim no longer wished to
pursue the charges; the victim was a drug addict and made up the
charges; and the court failed to inquire as to whether he could in




In a unanimous decision, the appellate division denied the de-
fendant's motion and affirmed the trial court's decision. 15 As for
the defendant's first argument, the appellate division held that the
defendant was not incompetent because he indicated that he "un-
derstood both the nature of the proceeding and that he was waiving
various rights, that he was satisfied with the services of his attorney,
and that he wished to enter an Alford plea to avoid the possibility of
being convicted of a more serious charge."' 6 As to the defendant's
second argument, the appellate division held that the trial court's
lack of inquiry into the defendant's medication did not necessarily
invalidate the plea because the defendant indicated "that he under-
stood the nature of the proceedings and the ramifications of the
plea."' 7 As to the defendant's third argument, the appellate divi-
9. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 484.
10. Id.
11. People v. Alexander, 726 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 2001).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 485-486 (Defendant argued that because of a medical
condition he was not able to kick the victim as she alleged).





sion held that it was not necessary for the trial court to make an
inquiry into the defendant's ability to perform the act because an
Alford plea did not require a factual recitation and the defendant's
"responses during the plea colloquy establish[ed] that the decision
of the defendant to enter an Alford plea was a voluntary and intelli-
gent choice among alternative courses of action available to him."' ,,
The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the defendant reiterated the same three arguments
to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion when it de-
nied his motion to dismiss the plea. 19 The court of appeals first
stated the general rule that trial judges are vested with discretion
when deciding whether a plea could be withdrawn. 20 The reason-
ing behind this rule is that trial judges are in the best position to
decide whether a plea was entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.2' The court further noted that requests to withdraw
guilty pleas are not granted without reason, and as such, a plea typi-
cally marks the end of a case and bars further litigation. 22
The court of appeals cited several cases where they upheld a
trial court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
23
In People v. Dixon, the court held that the defendant was not enti-
tled to withdraw a guilty plea due to a subsequent, unsupported,
claim of innocence because the plea was made voluntarily and
under the advice of counsel. 24 In People v. Feliciano, the court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea on the grounds that
he was ill and confused when he made the plea.
25
The court of appeals did, however, recognize some instances
where a denial of a motion to withdraw a plea was an abuse of dis-
cretion. 26 In People v. Englese, the court held that the trial court
18. Alexander, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 328. See also People v. Crandall, 710 N.Y.S.2d 127
(App. Div. 2000).
19. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 482.
20. Id. at 485.
21. Id.
22. See Id. (citing People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (1985); People v. Frederick, 45
N.Y.2d 520, 525 (1978)).
23. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 485.
24. 29 N.Y.2d 55 (1971).
25. 53 N.Y.2d 645 (1981).
26. 97 N.Y.2d at 485 (2002).
2003]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
erred in denying the motion where the indictment mislabeled a
misdemeanor as a felony. In People v. Nettles, the court determined
the trial court should have granted the motion when the plea was
the result of a "mutual mistake of fact and law."
27
Without addressing these two cases, the court of appeals deter-
mined that, in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion. 28 The court noted that the defendant, with advice of counsel,
told the trial court that "he understood the nature of the proceed-
ings and that his guilty plea entailed a waiver of various rights."
29
Further, the defendant noted that he understood that by submit-
ting the Alford plea, he was pleading guilty because he did not want
to be found guilty of a higher charge. 30 Based on these facts, the
court of appeals determined there was nothing to indicate the de-
fendant was uninformed, confused, or incompetent when he made
the plea and that there was enough evidence for the trial court to
assess whether he was alert and knowledgeable enough to plead
guilty voluntarily.
3 1
The court of appeals also ruled that even if the defendant had
a history of mental illness and had failed to take his medication the
day he pled guilty, it did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
he was incompetent to plead guilty on his own behalf.32 Further-
more, the court stated that even though the defendant was emo-
tionally distraught when he made the plea, it was not a basis to
require a withdrawal of the plea.3 3 In making its ruling on the de-
fendant's competence, the court also considered the defendant's
criminal history and noted that the defendant was a repeat offender
and was very familiar with the criminal justice system, having been
arrested over fifty times and pled guilty forty-two times.
34
As to the defendant's argument that he was innocent because
he was physically incapable of committing the acts alleged, the
court of appeals repeated the reasoning used by the appellate divi-
27. 30 N.Y.2d 841, 842 (1972).
28. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 486.




33. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 486, citing People v. Green, 75 N.Y.2d 902 (1990).
34. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 486 citing People v. Frederick, 45 N.Y.2d at 525.
[Vol. 47
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sion.3 5 The court of appeals stated that because the defendant's
Alford plea did not require a recitation of guilt, but rather a negotia-
tion of the charge, it was not incompatible with his claims of inno-
cence. 36 The court also noted that the defendant's allegations only
raised issues of credibility, which a trial court has the discretion to
summarily resolve against the defendant.3 7 Finally, the court added
that defendant did not plead guilty to the assault on the victim, but
rather pled guilty to the lesser charge of criminal contempt.38
As to the defendant's argument that the plea was invalid be-
cause the victim no longer wished to pursue them and in fact made
them up, the court stated that the reluctance of a victim to pursue
charges is not a sufficient reason to require a withdrawal of a guilty
plea.3 9 The court also noted that the particular circumstances sur-
rounding the crime were significant.40 The court recognized that
in many domestic violence cases, such as this one, there is a cycle of
domestic abuse in which beatings are followed by the victim's un-
willingness to pursue the charges. 4 1 The court found it unaccept-
able to allow this pattern to be used to withdraw a guilty plea.
42
In his dissent, Judge Smith argued that the trial court was obli-
gated to determine the defendant's competence to plead because
the failure of the court to find a factual basis for the plea under-
mined a fundamental principle that "no person should be found
guilty without some evidence from that person or the prosecutor
that there is factual basis for the plea."
43
In making his argument, Judge Smith first outlined the crime
of criminal contempt in the first degree which required, in relevant
part, "actual physical contact or the threat of physical contact.
'44
Considering the allegation that the victim, a former drug addict,
lied about the physical abuse and that the defendant was physically






41. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 487.
42. Id. ("It is regrettable enough that this pattern exists, let alone that it should be
used in support of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.")
43. Id: at 488-490
44. Id. at 489.
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incapable of committing the acts he was accused of, Judge Smith
argued that the court should not have accepted the Alford plea with-
out requiring the prosecution to show some kind of proof that the
defendant could have been guilty.45 Judge Smith agreed that the
Alford plea did not require a recitation of guilt, which meant the
defendant did not allocate any factual basis for his plea. 46 Without
such allocation, it became even more important for the prosecutor
to prove. Otherwise the principle that no person should be found
guilty without a factual determination would be violated.
47
IV. CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant the defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court affirmed
the order of the appellate division.
Eric Young
45. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d at 489.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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